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1956] INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACTS 
THE INSTALLMENT LAND CONTRACT AS A 
JUNIOR SECURITY 
E. George Rudolph* 
929 
THE law of mortgages has developed largely on the twin judicial assumptions that mortgagees as a class are hard-dealing per-
sons of considerable means and, on the other hand, that mortgagors 
are generally well-meaning but over-optimistic and in some degree 
incompetent in managing their own affairs. With increasing fre-
quency, and at the persistent urging of legal commentators,1 the 
courts have been carrying these assumptions over to cases involving 
long term installment purchase contracts. Obviously this law will 
work badly in transactions where the parties do not conform to 
these judge-made stereotypes. It is the purpose of this paper to 
explore the problems of one group whose members are increasing-
ly, and more or less as a matter of necessity, finding themselves in 
the role of mortgagees, or vendors under installment purchase 
contracts, although they do not fit the assumed pattern. This 
group consists of persons who own homes subject to existing mort-
gages and for one reason or another decide to sell. The existing 
mortgages may be insured by the Federal Housing Administration 
or by the Veterans Administration or they may be uninsured 
mortgages held by building and loan associations or other financial 
institutions, but almost all have one thing in common. They are 
payable over a long term of from ten to thirty years in equal 
monthly installments which include both principal and interest. 
Ideally a person wishing to sell his mortgaged home should in-
sist that his buyer pay cash o:r obtain his own loan and so refinance 
the mortgage indebtedness. This is generally possible since al-
most all such mortgages permit payment in advance of maturity 
on more or less liberal terms. This solution is best from the sel-
ler's point of view since it gives him the value of his equity in 
• A.B. 1941, J.D. 1943, University of Michigan; member, Illinois and Wyoming bars; 
Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.-Ed. 
l Ballantine, "Forfeiture for Breach of Contract," 5 MINN. L. R.Ev. 329 (1921); 
Vanneman, "Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts," 14 MINN. L. R.Ev. 342 (1930); Boden-
heimer, "Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Contracts in Utah," 3 UTAH L. REv. 
30 (1952); Brantman, "The Forfeiture Clause in Illinois Real Estate Contracts," 1950 Iu.. 
L. FORUM 249; Howe, "Forfeitures in Land Contract," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE l.F.GIS· 
LATION 417 (1954) (University of Michigan Legislative Research Center). 
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cash and relieves him from further liability for the mortgage in-
debtedness. Failing in this, the seller should attempt to receive 
the value of his equity in cash aild have his buyer assume the 
existing mortgage, which gives him the first of the advantages 
mentioned above but not the second. Unfortunately many pros-
pective sellers, and these are the ones with whom this paper is con-
cerned, cannot make a sale on either of the above plans. In most 
communities such a seller will find himself in competition with 
professional builders and developers who are financing their sales 
by government insured mortgages. Apart from matters of taste 
and quality the most important element of this competition con-
cerns the size of the down payment, with ten to twenty percent of 
the total purchase price being about the most that can be reason-
ably, expected. Since lending agencies and also government 
agencies which insure home loans are in general very conservative 
in appraising older homes, our prospective seller is apt to find that 
the available refinancing is not adequate to make possible a down 
payment sufficiently low to attract a buyer, unless he reduces the 
total asking price considerably below what he reasonably believes 
the property to be worth. Rather than do this, he is apt to decide 
to finance the buyer himself for the difference between his own 
asking price and the amount of the available down payment plus 
the amount of the existing mortgage indebtedness. If he so de-
cides, then he, or more properly his legal adviser, must give serious 
, thought to the problems now to be considered. 
These problems can best be illustrated by considering the situa-
tion of such a seller who has taken a second mortgage from his 
buyer for this balance with the buyer assuming the existing first 
mortgage debt. In the event that the buyer defaults on one or 
more of the monthly payments becoming due on the first mortgage 
indebtedness, our seller, now second mortgagee, can follow one of 
two courses. In the first place, he can do nothing for the time 
being, which means that sooner or later, if the default continues, 
the first mortgagee is going to accelerate the maturity of the unpaid 
balance and institute foreclosure proceedings. At this point the 
second mortgagee is going to have to take some action or run the 
risk of losing his security, since there is at least a strong possibility 
that the first mortgagee will bid the property in at the foreclosure 
sale for an amount not exceeding the first mortgage indebtedness 
and costs. In a state having a statute providing for redemption 
from sale he may be able to defer action until a later time,2 but the 
2 This will depend on whether or not the lien of the second mortgage will revive in 
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problem when the time comes will be much the same. In either 
event he will have to prepare himself to pay out, in cash, the 
amount of the first mortgage indebtedness, either to bid the prop-
erty in at the foreclosure sale or to redeem from the sale as the case 
may be. It is probably safe to assume that very few second mort-
gagees of the type with whom we are concerned have sufficient re-
sources of their own to do this, and," therefore, the real question is 
whether or not such a second mortgagee will be able to obtain a 
new loan for this purpose to be secured by a new first m~rtgage 
after the property has been bought in at the foreclosure sale or ac-
quired by redemption. The writer has no information as to 
whether such financing is generally available, nor as to the terms 
on which it is available. In any event, it seems a little reek.less to 
rely on the possibility of such refinancing in planning the original 
sale, since conditions respecting the availability of mortgage money 
are likely to change in unpredictable ways between then and the 
date of the default. 
If the above is not satisfactory to our seller, who has tentatively 
assumed the role of second mortgagee, and it certainly does not 
appear very attractive, there is another course he may pursue when 
the purchaser defaults on the first mortgage. He can immediately 
begin paying from his own pocket the monthly payments falling 
due on the first mortgage indebtedness, accelerate the maturity 
of the second mortgage indebtedness and institute his own fore-
closure proceedings, adding to the second mortgage indebtedness 
the amount which he has paid for principal and interest on the 
first mortgage debt and also any amount which he must pay for 
taxes and insurance. If we assume that the second mortgagee pur-
chases the property at the foreclosure sale subject to the first mort-
gage for the amount of the second mortgage indebtedness then he 
is back pretty much in his original position, richer by the amount 
of the down payment and the amount of principal previously paid 
on both mortgage debts but poorer by the amount that he has had 
to pay on the first mortgage debt as well as the amount of his costs 
and expenses. 
The obvious objection to this second alternative, from the 
point of view of the second mortgagee, is that it requires him to 
invest new money in property that he neither owns nor desires to 
the event the mortgagor, or more probably his assignee, redeems from the sale. If not, 
then the second mortgagee can hardly take the risk of such redemption. See Durfee and 
Doddridge, "Redemption From Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage Act," 23 M1CH. 
L. REv. 825 at 849-858 (1925). 
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own. In addition, a second mortgagee of the ~ype with whom we 
are concerned will probably have considerable difficulty in obtain-
ing the funds necessary to make the monthly payments and may 
even temporarily have to cut back his standard of living as the 
price of protecting his security. This brings us to the nub of the 
whole problem, because what the second mortgagee needs, and to 
what in justice he seems entitled, is the right to insist that the 
property itself provide the funds necessary to meet the payments 
on the first mortgage as they become due. This, of course, will 
mean ousting the mortgagor because he has already proved to be 
unable or unwilling to make periodic payments for the privilege 
of occupying the premises. But it is difficult to discover any 
equities in favor of permitting the mortgagor to remain in pos-
session rent free, so to speak, at the expense of the second mort-
gagee. The hardship on the mortgagee in this respect will be 
particularly acute in those states which have statutes giving the 
mortgagor the right to redeem from the foreclosure sale and the 
further right to remain in possession during the redemption 
period. 
In jurisdictions following the title theory of mortgages, it seems 
clear that the second mortgagee can take possession upon the 
mortgagor's default, although it is possible to argue that since the 
second mortgagee does not have legal title, that having previously 
vested in the first mortgagee, he cannot recover possession from 
the mortgagor. But the better view would seem to be that, as 
against the mortgagor, the second mortgagee has the same right 
of possession as the first mortgagee.3 In other jurisdictions, al-
though the general rule permits the mortgagor to retain possession 
as against the mortgagee even after default, it is possible to give 
the mortgagee an enforceable right to possession by an express pro-
vision in the mortgage.4 But regardless of their legal right to do so, 
mortgagees as a class are reluctant to take possession, either because 
it involves a multiplicity of suits or because of the burdens im-
posed by the obligation to account for rents and profits.5 How-
3 Wires & Peck v. Nelson, 26 Vt. 13 (1853), but see Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, 11 N.J. Eq. 
39 (1855). 
4DURFEE, CAsES oN SECURITY 53 (1951) lists, as having statutes which expressly pro• 
vide for this, the following states: Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon and South Dakota. 
5 In Illinois during the depression it was apparently standard procedure for the fore-
closing mortgagee to obtain a receiver even though in that state the mortgagee has an 
undoubted right of possession. See Carey, Brabner-Smith and Sullivan, "Studies in Fore-
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ever, in a number of states mortgagees cannot recover possession 
from the mortgagor after default even though by express provision 
the mortgage attempts to confer such a right, 6 and in these states 
the only way our second mortgagee can have the income of the 
property applied to the installments becoming due on the first 
mortgage is by a receivership.7 While it appears doubtful that 
the income potential of a single family dwelling will often be suf-
ficient to justify the expense of a receivership, no general conclu-
sion is possible on this since there are many reported cases involv-
ing receiverships for property of this type.8 But, for other reasons, 
a receivership is apt to be unavailable in this kind of case or an 
unsatisfactory remedy if obtained.9 
There is reason to believe that most sellers in this position, be-
cause of considerations more or less like those set out above, have 
elected to finance the sale by means of a long term installment con-
tract under which title is to remain in the seller until the purchase 
price is fully paid. Under the supposedly prevailing view such a 
contract should serve the purpose of the seller admirably. Assum-
closures in Cook County: II," 27 ILL. L. REv. 595 (1933). In the situations we are consid• 
ering the rules of accountability should not cause a second mortgagee in possession much 
concern. At most, they require that he rent the property for not less than its reasonable 
rental value and that he refrain from making unnecessary repairs or improvements. See 
2 GLENN, MORTGAGES §§216, 218 (1943). 
6 Hall v. Hall, 41 S.C. 163, 19 S.E. 305 (1894). Orr v. Bennett, 135 Minn. 443, 161 
N.W. 165 (1917); Hart v. Bingham, 171 Okla. 429, 43 P. (2d) 447 (1935); State ex rel. 
Gwinn, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Wash. 463, 16 P. (2d) 831 (1932); Nusbaum v. Shapero, 
249 Mich. 252, 228 N.W. 785 (1930). 
7 In neither Michigan nor Minnesota could a receiver be obtained for this purpose 
under any circumstances. Nusbaum v. Shapero, 249 Mich. 252, 228 N.W. 785 (1930); 
Nielsen v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N.W. 299 (1922). 
8 In Gritz v. Swartz, IO N.J. Misc. 1028, 162 A. 153 (1932), the court appointed re• 
ceivers in two foreclosure suits for properties having estimated rental values of $60 and 
$70 per month respectively, but refused to appoint a receiver in a third suit involving 
property having a rental value of only $25 per month. 
9 In the first place a second mortgagee of this type is not helped much by the rule 
which permits the appointment of a receiver upon a showing that the security is inade-
quate. In Nielsen v. Heald, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N.W. 299 (1922), and Baldwin v. Flagg, 
4 N.J.L.J. 181 (1881), the courts appointed a receiver on the suit of a second mortgagee 
because of the failure of the mortgagor to keep up the interest payments on the first 
mortgage. However, the Minnesota case is too restrictive to be of any help to our second 
mortgagee since it also required a showing of insolvency and inadequacy of security, and 
further held that the rents collected by the receiver could only be used to pay interest 
on the first mortgage and could not be used to pay maturing principal installments on 
that mortgage. 
Furthermore, the court is likely to be reluctant to appoint a receiver when the 
mortgagor occupies the premises as a home. See cases in annotation, 91 A.L.R. 1236 (1934). 
And the statutes providing for redemption from sale are apt to give difficulty. See Farm 
Mortgage Loan Co. v. Pettet, 51 N.D. 491, 200 N.W. 497 (1924), 36 A.L.R. 598 (1925); 
annotation, 26 A.L.R. 74 (1923). 
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ing that the contract includes the usual provisions making "time 
of the essence" and giving the seller the right to forfeit amounts 
paid as liquidated damages in the event the buyer defaults, then, 
upon the buyer's breach, the seller is entitled to retake possession 
and upon repossession all rights of the buyer in the property are 
terminated, amounts previously paid on the purchase price are 
forfeited and the seller is reinstated in his original ownership.10 
The principal defect in this, from the seller's point of view, lies in 
the fact that in most jurisdictions the seller's only remedy to re-
cover possession is an action of ejectment in the event that the 
buyer refuses to vacate peaceably.11 As a statistical proposition, 
the seller's chances of obtaining possession without litigation are 
probably quite good if his right to possession is clear as a matter of 
substantive law in the particular jurisdiction, and if there is no 
dispute concerning the quality of the premises or the fact of the 
buyer's breach.12 However, in that event, the seller may have to 
quiet title against the contract before he can again sell the property 
since, for some undefined period of time after repossession, there is 
at least a theoretical possibility that a court might decree specific 
performance of the contract at the suit of the buyer on the ground 
that the seller had waived compliance with the provision of the 
contract making time "of the essence," or by his conduct is estop-
ped from asserting the clause.13 As a practical matter the neces-
10 This is the hombook law on the subject. In the absence of a hombook, the reader 
is referred to the following among the many articles on the subject appearing in the 
periodicals: Ballantine, "Forfeiture for Breach of Contract," 5 MINN L. REv. 329 (1921); 
Vanneman, "Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts," 14 MINN. L. REv. 342 (1930); Simpson, 
"Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by Contract: II," 44 YALE L.J. 
754 at 773-779 (1935); Bodenheimer, "Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Con-
tracts in Utah," 3 UTAH L. REv. 30 (1952); Howe, "Forfeitures in Land Contracts," CUR-
RENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 417 (1954) (University of Michigan Legislative Research 
Center). 
1122 AM. JUR. 911 (1939). This is apparently the majority rule although in a number 
of states either by statute or otherwise summary proceedings in the nature of forcible 
entry or detainer are available. See cases collected in 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser 
§§1320 and 1321 (1934). Vendoxs frequently seek to obtain the advantages of such sum-
mary proceedings by providing in the contract that upon default the purchaser shall 
become a tenant at will. Such an attempt was unsuccessful in Smith v. Keech, 112 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 803 (1952), but apparently successful in State ex rel. Evexson v. Municipal Court of 
Barberton, 98 Ohio App. 177, 128 N.E. (2d) 467 (1954). 
12 The writer's only authority for this statement is a general impression gained from 
conversations with lawyexs and people in the real estate business. In the same vein it is 
interesting to note that in Wyoming forcible entry or detainer actions are commonly used 
by vendoxs to recover possession from defaulting purchasers since, even though the statute 
[Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §14-1502] does not provide for this, the Supreme Court has 
never ruled against it. Both propositions seem significant as illustrations of the fact that 
much of the law in this field cannot be found in the books. 
13 The only case of which the writer knows which involved a quiet title suit after a 
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sity for this quiet title action can probably be eliminated in most 
cases by withholding the contract from record, and such contracts 
frequently contain a provision which prohibits the buyer from 
recording. Whether the seller can properly insist on such a pro-
vision being included in the contract is another matter for, while 
the buyer's possession undoubtedly will be sufficient to protect 
his interest against subsequent purchasers or creditors of the seller, 
it may not be sufficient to protect him against a prior conveyance 
which is recorded after he has made the down payment and taken 
possession under the contract.14 
However, our seller is probably not justified in relying on the 
conventional view of installment land contracts, as summarized 
above, but must give consideration to the dangers involved in a 
seeming reform movement which is in progress in this branch of 
the law. This reform movement is aimed at protecting buyers 
under such contracts from the much discussed possibilities of un-
reasonably harsh forfeitures. The forfeiture occurs, of course, 
when the buyer, because of his default loses his entire interest in 
property having a value greatly in excess of the amount remaining 
unpaid under the contract. As an original proposition a court or 
legislature could afford protection against such forfeitures in a 
number of ways. The most obvious solution, because of the mort-
gage analogy, would be to require a public sale in order to make 
the excess value available to the defaulting buyer in cash. A sec-
ond possibility is to give the buyer additional time in which to 
make good his default and preserve his rights under the contract 
in spite of the "time of the essence" clause. A third possibility is 
to require the seller to refund the amount of payments previously 
made by the buyer, less the amount of the seller's damages, at the 
time of terminating the buyer's rights under the contract. Even 
though it is conceded that the seller should not be permitted to 
profit at the expense of the buyer by a strict enforcement of the 
forfeiture provision, yet some of the means devised to protect 
against such forfeitures seem likely to work undue hardship on 
prior ejectment action is Barnes v. Clement, 8 S.D. 421, 66 N.W. 810 (1896), rehearing 
12 S.D. 270, 81 N.W. 301 (1899). The reason for this is discussed hereafter. The articles 
cited in note IO supra discuss the waiver problem, generally in terms of the much cited 
statement from Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, Equity," 33 HARv. L. REv. 
929 at 952 (1920), to the effect that "Strict doctrines as to forfeiture inevitably produce 
loose doctrines as to 'waiver.' " See also annotation, 107 A.L.R. 345 (1937). 
14 See note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 93 at 109 (1954); contra, Hawkins v. Staffers, 40 Wyo. 
226, 276 P. 452 (1929), rehearing 40 Wyo. 245, 278 P. 76 (1929). 
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sellers who have used such a contract to obtain a junior security 
interest in property subject to a prior mortgage on which install-
ments become due at frequent intervals. As previously noted the 
peculiar problem of a seller of this kind is to prevent the first 
mortgage from going into default and the desirable solution, from 
his point of view, is to retake possession on the buyer's default and 
then rent the premises so as to provide a source of income from 
which to pay the monthly installments on the first mortgage. 
Unfortunately there is at least some authority for denying the 
seller an immediate right of possession after default in order to 
protect the buyer from forfeiture. This proposition has probably 
been most fully developed in Colorado. The case of Gold Mines, 
Inc. v. Gold, Silver and Tungsten, Inc.15 involved a lease of cer-
tain mining properties and equipment with an option in the lessee 
to purchase and have amounts theretofore paid as rent credited on 
the purchase price. The majority of the court construed the con-
tract as a whole to be the equivalent of an installment purchase 
contract. It included a clause giving the seller the right to re-
enter and terminate all rights of the buyer thereunder in the 
event of default which was very similar to the ordinary forfeiture 
provision in the usual form of installment purchase contract. The 
buyer defaulted after paying a considerable part of the total price 
and expending even larger amounts for permanent improvements. 
The seller brought ejectment. Previous Colorado cases involving 
contracts which did not include an express forfeiture provision 
had held that, after the purchaser had made substantial payments, 
the only remedy available to the seller was foreclosure by sale.16 
The court in the Gold Mines, Inc. case relied on these earlier cases, 
in spite of the seller's attempts to distinguish them, but ordered a 
somewhat different type of decree under which the purchaser was 
given a further period of six months within which to redeem, the 
implication being that if the purchaser failed to redeem within 
this period a judgment for possession should be entered for the 
plaintiff. This, of course, bears a marked resemblance to a decree 
for strict foreclosure of a mortgage and the relationship is made 
even more obvious by the following language from the opinion: 
"Therefore, since, as we think, payment of money by plaintiff 
15 104 Colo. 478, 93 P. (2d) 973 (1939). On the Colorado law see comment, 22 ROCKY 
MT. L. REv. 296 (1950). . 
16Fairview Mining Corp. v. American Mines and Smelting Co., 86 Colo. 77, 278 P. 
800 (1929). 
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in error, and the receipt thereof by defendant in error, was 
the motivating purpose of the contract, the situation comes 
within the equitable rule that where a vendee has substan-
tially performed, the contract simply operates as an instru-
ment of security as to the balance to be paid. In such situa-
tion there is breathed into what may be termed the severe 
legal language of a contract, 'an equity superior to its terms.' 
It follows that one seeking at law to realize on such a contract, 
may, if his selection of remedy be challenged through inter-
position of an answer in equity, as here, find himself remitted 
to an equitable remedy.''17 
This form of decree for a time seemed to have become standard 
in Colorado with the result of delaying the seller for an additional 
period of six months in his right to re-enter after default.18 The 
six months period was borrowed from the statute on redemption 
from foreclosure sale and appeared to be inflexible. 
The case of Cavos v. Geihsler19 involved an application of the 
rule to a situation of exactly the type we are considering. Cavos 
owned a house subject to a mortgage of $3,000 which he sold on a 
contract to Geihsler, for a total price of $4,500, the latter paying 
$200 down, assuming the payment of the mortgage and agreeing 
to pay the remaining $1,300 in specified monthly installments. In 
addition, Geihsler was to pay the taxes and keep the premises in-
sured. Upon default by Geihsler, Cavos brought an action for 
possession, the trial court entered a decree ordering foreclosure by 
sale, and on appeal by Cavos the Supreme Court reversed in part, 
ordering a decree patterned after that in the Gold Mines, Inc. case. 
Cavos' principal argument was that the rule of Gold Mines, Inc. 
applied only in cases where the buyer had paid a substantial part 
of the contract price, whereas Geihsler still owed him $1,534.39 or 
$34.39 more than the original contract price for Cavos' equity, the 
additional amount above $1,300 resulting from payments made by 
Cavos for taxes and interest on the mortgage debt. The court, 
however, held that the Gold Mines, Inc. case was applicable be-
cause Geihsler had reduced the mortgage debt to $2,200 and to 
that extent had acquired a substantial equity in the property which 
would be lost through enforcing the forfeiture provision. It is in-
17 Gold Mines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver and Tungsten, Inc., 104 Colo. 478 at 499, 93 P. 
(2d) 973 (1939). 
18 Wiley v. Lininger, 119 Colo. 497, 204 P. (2d) 1083 (1949). 
19 109 Colo. 163, 123 P. (2d) 822 (1942). 
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teresting to note that the fairness of this decree was not questioned 
on the ground that Cavos had previously had to pay tax.es and in-
terest on the mortgage to protect his security and, as the court ex-
pressly recognized, would probably have to pay further amounts 
for such purposes and also for principal installments on the mort-
gage becoming due during the six-month redemption period. The 
significance of the case on this point is obscured, not only by the 
failure of the court to discuss it, but also by the fact that a receiver 
had been appointed on Cavos' application at the time he com-
menced his action. Such a receivership does not seem appropriate 
in an ejectment action but is entirely consistent with the court's 
treatment of the suit as one for foreclosure, and it is possible to 
argue that Cavos, by his application for the receiver, acquiesced in 
this treatment. The opinion does not state whether the receiver 
ousted Geihsler or merely attempted to collect rent from him, 
but in any event he was apparently not very successful in keeping 
down the prior burdens on the property. 
Later Colorado cases have again unsettled the law in that 
jurisdiction. Of these the most important is Self v. Watt,20 which 
was a suit by the vendor to have the purchaser's interest under the 
contract terminated and for possession. This, in substance, was 
a suit for strict foreclosure and was certainly in accordance with 
the theory of the cases discussed above. The purchaser did not 
bother to appear or defend because his attorney assured him that 
he would have six months after the decree within which to redeem. 
The trial court, however, allowed only thirty days for redemption 
and this was affirmed on appeal, the court saying that the redemp-
tion period was a matter within the discretion of the trial court. 
In addition, two recent cases contain dictum indicating that the 
court may give literal effect to the "time of the essence" clauses al-
though such clauses appeared to have been invalidated by the 
Gold Mines, Inc. and Cavos cases.21 
The law of Kentucky is similar, on the surface at least, to that 
of Colorado in denying the seller the remedy of ejectment when 
necessary to protect the buyer from forfeiture. In the leading case 
of Morton v. Dickson22 the Kentucky court held that the proper 
remedy for the seller, on the buyer's default, was a suit for specific 
20 128 Colo. 61, 259 P. (2d) 1074 (1953). 
21 Newton v. Canty, 119 Colo. 381, 203 P. (2d) 910 (1949); Gerbaz v. Hulsey, (Colo. 
1955) 288 P. (2d) 357. 
22 90 Ky. 572, 14 S.W. 905 (1890). 
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performance with the decree to provide for the sale of the prop-
erty in the event that the buyer failed to pay the unpaid balance 
within a reasonable time. In the alternative the seller could bring 
suit to foreclose his vendor's lien but that would amount to the 
same thing in end result. In Kentucky, as in Colorado, each case 
presents an issue of fact as to whether enforcement of the forfeiture 
provision will, under the circumstances, operate inequitably to 
the buyer.23 In this respect, and for purposes of the present dis-
cussion, the case of Jl.tiaschinot v. Moore24 is encouraging. There 
the plaintiff had sold a house to defendant for a total price of 
$2,000. The contract provided for c:1- down payment of $100 and 
the payment of the balance in monthly installments of $25. The 
court sustained a judgment in ejectment for the plaintiff on the 
ground that there was no inequitable forfeiture in view of the 
nominal down payment and the fact that the monthly payments 
were less than the fair rental value of the property.25 There is 
language in the opinion which indicates that the court believes 
that long term installment contracts generally should be treated 
differently from sales contracts providing for a substantial down 
payment and the payment of the balance in one or two installments 
within a short period after the execution of the contract. In any 
event it is submitted that the court has made a realistic analysis 
of the question of forfeiture as presented by the typical installment 
purchase contract involving residential property. 
The law of Oregon deserves mention at this point, since the 
court there has apparently been able to approach very closely in 
practical end results the rule of Colorado without ever challenging 
the enforceability of the "time of the essence" and forfeiture pro-
visions as an abstract proposition. Probably the key case to an 
understanding of the Oregon situation is Swick v. Mueller.26 
Under the terms of the contract involved in that case the seller 
could declare a forfeiture after any default had continued for 
thirty days. The buyer defaulted on a payment becoming due on 
June 1, and the seller served a notice of forfeiture on the morning 
23 In Harris v. Greenleaf, 117 Ky. 817, 79 S.W. 267 (1904), the court granted equitable 
relief to a defaulting purchaser who had paid only ten dollars on the contract on the 
ground that the forfeiture would be unjust because of appreciation in the value of the 
property subsequent to the sale. 
24 275 Ky. 36, 120 S.W. (2d) 750 (1938). 
25 This is somewhat confusing since it is not stated if the twenty-five dollars includes 
interest or is principal only. 
26193 Ore. 668, 238 P. (2d) 717 (1951). 
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of July 1, apparently forgetting that June has only thirty days. 
Later the seller brought suit to recover possession and for damages 
for unlawful holding over. The buyer counterclaimed for restitu-
tion of amounts paid on the contract and recovered. The court 
reasoned that the seller breached the contract by declaring the 
forfeiture prematurely and that this breach gave the buyer the 
right to rescind the contract and obtain restitution. A similar 
result will follow if the seller, having waived the "time of the es-
sence" clauses, declares a forfeiture without having first given 
notice to reinstate the clause.27 On the other hand, a premature 
or otherwise wrongful declaration of forfeiture will not preclude 
the seller from maintaining a suit for strict foreclosure.28 The 
writer has no way of knowing the exact effect of these decisions on 
Oregon practice, but it is a fact that a large majority of the cases 
involving land contracts which have reached the Supreme Court 
of Oregon in recent years have been suits for strict foreclosure 
rather than suits to enforce forfeitures either by ejectment or 
other means.29 
When the reform has been accomplished by legislation it has 
generally taken similar form, the statutes providing for something 
in the nature of strict foreclosure in place of an abrupt and ab-
solute forfeiture.30 
Furthermore, there is another factor which could very well 
contribute to a trend toward strict foreclosure as the prevailing 
remedy. To develop this it is first necessary to consider a problem 
27 Grider v. Turnbow, 162 Ore. 622, 94 P. (2d) 285 (1939). 
28 Zumstein v. Stockton, 199 Ore. 633, 264 P. (2d) 455 (1953). See also Dorsey v. 
Tisbey, 192 Ore. 163, 234 P. (2d) 557 (1951), to the effect that a declaration of forfeiture 
does not so completely terminate the contract as to preclude its subsequent enforcement 
by strict foreclosure. In general the cases seem to indicate that the courts will be very 
strict with vendors who seek to enforce a forfeiture, but quite indulgent of those who 
proceed by suit for strict foreclosure. 
29 This statement is based on an examination of Oregon cases appearing in the Gen-
eral Digest, for approximately the last twenty years under the heading "Vendor and 
Purchaser,'' Key Numbers 296 to 300. On strict foreclosure of land contracts generally 
see annotation, 77 A.L.R. 270 (1932). 
so For purposes of this statement the term strict foreclosure should be unde:ratood to 
include statutory provisions such as those in Minnesota and Iowa which permit the buyer 
to make good his default within a specified period after notice of forfeiture. Minn. Stat. 
(1953) §559.21; Iowa Code (1954) §§656.1 to 656.6. The South Dakota provision, on the 
other hand, is expressly labelled strict foreclosure and provides for a period of redemption 
of not less than ten days after the judgment. S.D. Code (1939) §37.3101. The Michigan 
statute is similar except that the foreclosure is acc9mplished by a summary action similar 
to forcible entry or detainer and the redemption period is ninety days. Mich. Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§630.12, 630.25. For an extended discussion of the various statutory provi-
sions see Howe, "Forfeitures in Land Contracts," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 
417 (1954). See also note, 39 MINN. L. R.Ev. 93 (1954). 
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of res judicata. If the seller, after default, brings an action of 
ejectment then, even though he is successful in recovering pos-
session, he may find it necessary in the future to bring a suit to 
quiet title.31 At least two courts have said, by way of dictum, that 
under some circumstances the buyer may be able to maintain a 
suit for specific performance even after the seller has recovered in 
an ejectment action.32 Strangely enough, there seems to be a lack 
of square rulings on the question, but the problem is susceptible to 
further analysis. Assume, for example, that the buyer in his later 
suit for specific performance contends that the seller had waived 
the "time of the essence" clause. This then would raise the ques-
tion as to whether the matter of waiver had already been deter-
mined in the ejectment action, and this in turn would depend on 
whether the buyer could assert the waiver as a defense in that 
action. On this question a California court has said that such 
waiver will constitute a defense only if the buyer tenders the 
amount necessary to make good his delinquency.33 If the buyer 
was unable to make such tender then presumably the seller would 
prevail in his ejectment action but the buyer might later maintain 
a suit for specific performance. However, there is at least some 
hint in the California case that in order to forestall this possiblity 
the court should grant a 1;easonable period of time within which 
the buyer could make good his default and avoid the judgment in 
ejectment. In substantive effect, then, this would seem to make 
over the ejectment action into a strict foreclosure suit if th.e buyer 
can prove waiver. On the other hand, the Illinois court has said, 
though not held, that the waiver will be a defense to the ejectment 
action without tender of the amounts in default.34 But under 
31 As noted above, quiet title suits following ejectment actions are quite rare. Note 
13 supra. However, they are common when the seller has been able to repossess without 
judicial assistance and later attempts to resell. The cases reaching the appellate courts are 
those in which the defaulting buyer has sought to take advantage of this opportunity to 
obtain some sort of equitable relief such as restitution or specific performance. See Law-
rence v. Demos, 70 Wyo. 56, 244 P. (2d) 793 (1952), and Asher v. Hull, 207 Okla. 478, 250 
P. (2d) 866 (1952). 
32 Hansborough v. Peck, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 497 (1866); Holden v. Holden, 24 III. App. 
106 (1887). Both of these cases were decided before the advent of the modem procedural 
rule permitting equitable defenses in law actions, but it is doubtful that this is of much 
significance. See Neil v. Kennedy, 319 III. 75, 149 N.E. 775 (1925). 
33 Watkins v. Warren, 122 Cal. App. 617, IO P. (2d) 500 (1932). 
34 Neil v. Kennedy, 319 III. 75, 149 N.E. 775 (1925). This decision reversed a holding 
in favor of the buyer in the seller's ejectment action because of a rather unsubstantial 
error in instructions. The seller then apparently abandoned the ejectment action because 
the buyer later brought suit for specific performance and the seller counterclaimed for 
quiet title and possession. This eventually resulted in a decree for specific performance 
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either view the ejectment judgment should be conclusive on the 
question of waiver. 
Most lawyers, however, apparently elect to avoid this problem 
of res judicata by joining a prayer for quiet title relief with the 
· ejectment action.35 Such a combination suit bears a strong resem-
blance to foreclosure, and the courts must frequently feel a strong 
inclination to grant some opportunity for redemption. An in-
teresting illustration of this .is found in a Washington case, Lam-
paert v. Marohn.36 This was a combination suit of the kind dis-
cussed above, and at the conclusion of the trial the judge made 
findings in favor of the seller, but stated that he would delay enter-
ing judgment for a period of about three weeks during which the 
buyers could pay the amount in default, the implication being that 
if they did so the suit would be dismissed. The Supreme Court on 
appeal spoke approvingly of this, but since the buyers did not at-
tempt to redeem during this period, and since the sellers did not 
- appeal, the court was not called upon to determine the propriety 
of the procedure.37 Strictly speaking, it was incorrect, since in a 
suit of this kind the court by its decree does not accomplish the 
forfeiture but only determines that it has previously occurred.38 
However there is some authority to the effect that when the seller 
seeks to quiet title against the buyer the court is justified in giving 
the buyer equitable relief regardless of the seller's legal right to 
insist on a forfeiture.39 While the equitable relief afforded to 
buyers in these cases has been restitution of amounts previously 
paid, there is no reason why, on the same basis, the buyer could not 
be given an opportunity to redeem. 
It is difficult to assess the significance of a substitution of strict 
foreclosure for the right of absolute forfeiture from the point of 
substantially the same as a decree for strict foreclosure. See Kennedy v. Neil, 333 Ill. 629, 
165 N.E. 148 (1929). 
85 No attempt will be made to support this assertion other than to say it rests on an 
impression gained in making the Digest search referred to in note 28 supra. The joinder 
of the two seems incongruous since usually ejectment is considered the proper remedy for 
one out of possession and quiet title the proper remedy for one in possession. However, 
if ejectment won't adequately settle the title question, then the fact that it is available 
should not bar quiet title relief. See Holden v. Holden, 24 Ill. App. 106 (1887). 
86 11 Wash. (2d) 211, 118 P. (2d) 954 (1941). 
87 See also Elley v. Caldwell, 158 Mo. 372, 59 S.W. 111 (1900). 
88Abbas v. Demont, 152 Neb. 77, 40 N.W. (2d) 265 (1949). This was a simple eject• 
ment action and the court held it was error for the trial court to grant a sixty-day 
redemption period. See also Owen v. Stark, 175 Kan. 800, 267 P. (2d) 948 (1954). 
89 Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 S. 714 (1923). See also the Oklahoma cases cited 
in note 51 infra. 
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view of a seller of the type we are considering. Since it always 
seems to be assumed that the buyer is entitled to remain in pos-
session during the period granted for redemption, the seller must 
sustain the burden of maintaining the payments on the first mort-
gage during this additional period. But the seriousness of this 
can be determined only by comparing the time necessary to obtain 
the strict foreclosure decree plus the redemption period with the 
time necessary to prosecute an ejectment action to judgment. De-
pending on local conditions, it is possible that a seller might be 
subjected to greater delay by the buyer's demand for a jury trial in 
an ejectment action than by a foreclosure decree providing for a 
period of redemption. In this respect the strict foreclosure pro-
vided by statute in Michigan would seem quite satisfactory to sel-
lers. There the seller is granted a summary remedy similar to 
forcible entry or detainer, but the buyer is permitted to remain 
in possession for a period of ninety days following the judgment, 
during which period he may redeem.40 Much, of course, depends 
on the length of the redemption period.41 The six-month period 
granted by the original Colorado cases would seem too long for 
many situations, as that court eventually recognized.42 Actually 
the principal protection of the buyer lies in denying the seller the 
right to effect a forfeiture by notice immediately upon default, 
and the court can, therefore, with propriety, take into account the 
time which has elapsed between the default and the entry of the 
foreclosure decree in setting the redemption period.43 
In principle there seems to be no reason why the right to pos-
session must be considered as tied inseparably to the right to en-
force a forfeiture. In other words, it should be possible to draft a 
contract giving the seller a right to possession which could be en-
forced without precluding, or purporting to preclude, the buyer 
from later redeeming. Such a provision would give the seller 
rights similar to a mortgagee in a title theory jurisdiction,44 and 
40 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§630.12, 630.25. See Durfee and Duffy, "Foreclosure of 
Land Contracts in Michigan," 7 MICH. S.B.J. 166, 221 (1928). 
41 Among the Oregon cases, the court affirmed decrees providing the following periods: 
Airport Lumber Co. v. Annes, 203 Ore. 294, 279 P. (2d) 1038 (1955) (42 days); Grider v. 
Turnbow, 162 Ore. 622, 94 P. (2d) 285 (1939) (3 months); Zumstein v. Stockton, 199 Ore. 
633, 264 P. (2d) 455 (1953) (1 year). In the last case the long period was justified on the 
ground that prior to default the buyer had paid $20,000 out of a total price of $36,000. 
42 Self v. Watt, 128 Colo. 61, 259 P. (2d) 1074 (1953). 
43 Airport Lumber Co. v. Annes, 203 Ore. 294, 279 P. (2d) 1038 (1955). Here the 
court sustained a redemption period of forty-two days on the ground that sixteen months 
had elapsed between the purchaser's default and the entry of the decree. 
44 In Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wash. (2d) 441, 206 P. (2d) 300 (1949), the vendors took 
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would remove the. principal objection to strict foreclosure from 
the point of view of the sellers with whom we are here concerned. 
As a practical matter this involves some diffiiculties. In most 
jurisdictions the seller's right to possession under such a provision 
would have to be enforced by an ejectment action. If this had to 
be followed by a later foreclosure suit there would be an undesir-
able multiplicity of suits. The only obvious way to avoid the 
necessity for this subsequent foreclosure suit is to include a pro-
vision in the contract for power of sale foreclosure. However, in 
at least one case the court held that the inclusion of such a pro-
vision made the contract in legal effect a mortgage, 45 and as a 
matter of policy it is doubtful that sellers as a class should do any-
thing to promote foreclosure by sale as a usual remedy for breach 
of installment land contracts.46 
From the seller's viewpoint strict foreclosure is by no means 
as objectionable as the rule which permits the buyer to recover 
amounts already paid, less the seller's damages, when the seller 
brings suit to terminate the contract either by ejectment or other-
wise.47 This rule has prevailed for some time in Utah48 and 
Georgia49 and is now apparently the law in California.50 There is 
also some authority for this in Oklahoma although the law in that 
state is by no means clear.51 The rule has been quite fully de-
possession after the purchasers breached the contract and abandoned the premises but 
did not give notice of forfeiture. The purchasers claimed that this constituted a rescission 
of the contract and sued for restitution of their down-payment. The court held there was 
no rescission inasmuch as the vendors had the right to repossess the property in order 
to preserve it without either forfeiting the contract or rescinding it. See also Williams v. 
Baker, 207 Ark. 731, 182 S.W. (2d) 753 (1944). 
45 Pope v. Parker, 84 Colo. 535, 271 P. 1118 (1928). 
46 This observation is prompted by the thought that if foreclosure by sale became the 
prevailing remedy the legislatures of some states might be inclined to extend the redemp• 
tion from sale statutes to cover such foreclosure sale. 
47 The Supreme Court of Utah recently sustained a judgment for restitution entered 
in an unlawful detainer action. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah (2d) 59, 278 P. (2d) 294 (1954). 
On the right of buyers to restitution generally see annotation, 31 A.L.R. (2d) 8 eI953). 
48The leading Utah case is Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331,218 P. 975 (1923). See 
Bodenheimer, "Forfeitures Under Real Estate Installment Contracts in Utah,'' 3 UTAH L. 
R.Ev. 30 (1952); note, 4 UTAH L R.Ev. 283 (1954). 
49 Lytle v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905). 
50Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. (2d) 16, 230 P. (2d) 629 (1951), noted, 25 So. 
CAL. L. R.Ev. 387 (1952). 
51 Lansford v. Gloyd, 89 Okla. 232, 215 P. 198 (1923); Ezzell v. Endsley, 197 Okla. 194, 
169 P. (2d) 309 (1946). Other cases indicate that if the vendor confines his action to 
ejectment and does not seek any equitable relief, then the purchaser will not be entitled 
to restitution. Sparks v. Trosper, 186 Okla. 289, 97 P. (2d) 81 (1939); Asher v. Hull, 207 
O~a. 478, 250 P. (2d) 866 (1952). However, in both of these cases the court found that 
the rental value of the premises during the defendant's occupancy exceeded the amount 
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veloped by recent Utah cases and these cases will serve well to 
illustrate its undesirable features so far as sellers are concerned, 
especially sellers who have used installment land contracts to 
finance the sale of mortgaged residential property. 
In the first place the rule requires that the seller be in a posi-
tion to pay out a substantial sum of money as a condition to en-
forcing his right to recover possession after the buyer's default.52 
As will be shown later, this usually amounts to refunding the 
down payment to the defaulting buyer. But the sellers we are 
considering will usually have used the down payments, when re-
ceived, in the purchase of a new home and will probably be unable 
to make the required restitution unless some refinancing can be 
arranged. The problem is well illustrated by the recent Utah case 
of Jacobson v. Swan,53 although it involved a somewhat different 
transaction. · Swan, the defendant, desired to purchase a home 
offered for sale by a third person for a total price of $14,000, but 
was able to pay only $4,000 in cash, which was not sufficient to 
make the purchase. Therefore, Jacobson, a salesman for the real 
estate agency which had the listing, made the purchase in his own 
name, using for that purpose Swan's $4,000, $5,000 of his own 
funds and $5,000 which he had borrowed, presumably on a mort-
gage of the property. Jacobson then sold the property to Swan on 
a contract reciting a down payment of $4,000. When Jacobson 
sued to recover possession after Swan's default the court required 
him to repay to Swan the sum of $3,190, being the difference be-
tween the amount Swan had paid on the contract and the reason-
able rental value of the premises during the time he was in pos-
session. Jacobson argued that this was unfair since Swan's down 
payment had gone to the original owner and a substantial part of 
the periodic payments he had received had gone to pay principal 
and interest on the $5,000 loan. This meant that he had no funds 
from the contract with which to make restitution and so in effect 
was being required to make a new investment in the property in 
of his payments so that there was in fact no forfeiture. Apparently a combination suit to 
recover possession and quiet title will be an equitable suit for purposes of the above 
distinction. Stone v. Ritzinger, 194 Okla. 653, 153 P. (2d) 1006 (1944). See also Taylor v. 
Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 S. 714 (1923). 
52 This point seems to be generally overlooked when the problem of forfeiture is 
discussed in terms of the distinction between liquidated damage provisions and penalties. 
In Corbin, "The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid," 
40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931), the problem is recognized but not dealt with very conclusively. 
53 3 Utah (2d) 59, 278 P. (2d) 294 (1954). 
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order to enforce his security. The court could see nothing wrong 
with this so long as the rental value of the property was sufficient 
to pay interest on the whole purchase price. In Lytle v. Scottish 
American Mortgage Co.,54 the leading Georgia case, the court 
recognized the possible hardship in requiring the seller to maintain 
himself in a position of readiness to make restitution but suggested 
that the seller could avoid the necessity for this by bringing suit to 
foreclose by sale. This seems to go part way at least toward out-
lawing the installment land contract by indirection. 
Secondly, even though the seller should at the very least be 
entitled to have the property stay sold, the rule permitting restitu-
tion seems in practical operation to give the buyer the right to 
rescind at will.55 The most complete statement of the formula 
for determining the amount of the buyer's recovery is contained 
in Perkins v. Spencer.56 The general rule is that the buyer is en-
titled to recover the amount that he has paid less the amount of 
damages occasioned to the seller by the buyer's breach. The 
seller's damages include the rental value of the property during 
the period of the seller's occupancy and any depreciation in value 
due either to the actions of the buyer or to a decline in the real 
estate market. As a practical matter it is, of course, somewhat un-
realistic to speak of a market value for any particular piece of real 
estate, and the seller when he repossesses has no assurance that he 
will be able to make another sale at a price equal to the judicially 
determined market value.57 As a matter of fact, in the few cases 
which have considered the measure of a particular buyer's recovery 
under the particular facts involved, none have given the seller any 
credit for a depreciation in value, so the formula used has always 
been merely the difference between the amount the buyer has paid 
and the rental value of the property.58 Since the typical contract 
54 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905). 
55 In Lawrence v. Demos, 70 Wyo. 56, 244 P. (2d) 793 (1952), the court, in denying 
the buyer's claim for restitution, emphasized the anomaly in permitting the defaulting 
buyer to rescind on the ground of his own breach. Technically it may be said that the 
right of restitution does not arise upon the buyer's breach but only upon the seller's 
election to terminate the contract because of such breach. Corbin, "The Right of a De-
faulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid," 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931). This 
distinction will afford little comfort to the seller who must take steps to protect his 
interest shortly after the breach occurs. 
56 (Utah 1952) 243 P. (2d) 446. 
57 In the California rase, Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. (2d) 16, 230 P. (2d) 629 
(1951), the seller had already repossessed and resold at a higher price before the buyer 
asserted his claim to restitution. Obviously the buyer's case is stronger under such facts. 
58 Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah (2d) 59, 278 P. (2d) 294 (1954); Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 
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provides for monthly payments very nearly equal to the going 
monthly rental rate for similar property, the buyer's recovery in 
most cases will closely approximate the original down payment. 
This in effect converts the installment land contract into a lease 
with option to purchase. 
Lastly, it should be noted that in both Georgia and Utah the 
courts have indicated that the defaulting buyer is entitled to resti-
tution for the value of improvements which he has added to the 
property during his occupancy.59 In a very real sense then it would 
seem possible for the buyer to improve the seller out of his estate. 
Again the only answer to the hardship which this will likely impose 
on the seller is that he can foreclose by sale if he chooses. 
A number of the commentators on the subject have stressed 
the need for legislation and on this the present writer is inclined 
to agree although, perhaps, for somewhat different reasons.60 In 
the first place, no seller can safely contract in reliance on the cases 
of his jurisdiction enforcing forfeitures since it is possible for the 
court to abandon these in principle at any time in the interest of 
protecting buyers as a class. The ease with which this can be done 
is illustrated by the experience in Colorado and also in California, 
where the courts had vigorously enforced forfeiture provisions 
until the recent cases granting restitution.61 Second, there is apt 
to be a considerable spread between the law of a jurisdiction, 
stated as an abstract proposition, and the law in practical operation 
in that jurisdiction.62 The Oregon situation discussed above is 
probably an illustration of this. And third, the courts in many 
jurisdictions, out of sympathy for buyers, have imposed meaning-
less technical requirements on the seller's right to enforce forfei-
Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923); Lansford v. Gloyd, 89 Okla. 232, 215 P. 198 (1923); Ezzell v. 
Endsley, 197 Okla. 194, 169 P. (2d) 309 (1946). 
59 Lytle v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 S.E. 402 (1905); Perkins 
v. Spencer, (Utah 1952) 243 P. (2d) 446. 
60 Howe, "Forfeitures in Land Contracts," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE l.Ec:ISLATION 417 
(1954); note, 39 MINN. L. REv. 93 (1954). 
61 The leading California case for the strict enforcement of forfeitures was Glock v. 
Howard and Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898). The leading case for avoid-
ing forfeitures by decreeing restitution is Freedman v. Rector, 37 Cal. (2d) 16, 230 P. (2d) 
629 (1951). See also Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. (2d) 36, 216 P. (2d) 13 (1950). The Cali-
fornia law is discussed in note, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 387 (1952); and note, 37 CALIF. L. REv_ 
704 (1949). 
62 See Brantman, "The Forfeiture Clause in Illinois Real Estate Contracts," 1950 ILL. 
L. FoRUM 249 at 257. After reviewing the Illinois cases the writer concludes, " .•• that 
the forfeiture clause is neither entirely enforceable according to its literal terms nor 
entirely unenforceable." 
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tures. These usually take the form of rules with respect to "notice" 
and "waiver," but may also include procedural distinctions which 
serve no useful purpose, such as those found in Oklahoma.63 
Assuming the need, it must be recognized that the drafting of 
such legislation is a matter involving considerable difficulties. 
First of all, it is submitted that no satisfactory statutory solution is 
possible if the draftsmen are exclusively pre-occupied with devis-
ing means to protect buyers from the hardships of forfeiture.64 
In addition, the draftsmen of such legislation must recognize that 
solutions which seem desirable as a matter of abstract logic may 
prove unworkable in practice, and that, therefore, such legislation 
must be prepared on the basis of factual data concerning the law 
in operation. Finally, there are policy questions to be considered 
in this area that go beyond the hardships of forfeiture. 
The policy questions are the most difficult and must be dis-
posed of before any satisfactory approach can be made to the 
others. The problems under this heading can all be summarized 
in the inquiry as to why the law should sanction the installment 
land contract as a separate form at all, since it apparently serves 
the same function as the purchase money mortgage. No answer to 
this question can be made in terms of freedom of contract since 
the whole law of mortgages is largely built on an abridgment of this 
freedom. The answer generally given to justify the installment 
land contract is that it permits the purchase of real estate with a 
smaller down payment than would be acceptable to the seller in a 
purchase money mortgage u:ansaction. 65 This, of course, raises a 
further policy question as to the desirability of easy credit terms, 
but lately that has been considered primarily a question of federal 
rather than state policy. In the type of transaction we are consid-
ering, the sale qf residential property for owner occupancy, a par-
tial answer to the question of federal policy is found in the exist-
ence of the government mortgage insurance programs. It is 
possible to argue that liberal credit terms in the purchase of a 
home should be available only in those instances where both the 
buyer and the seller have the advantage of the protective features 
63 See cases cited in note 51 supra. 
64 In the writer's opinion the recent Maryland statute is an example of this. Md. Code 
Ann: (1951) art. 21, §118-123. For an illustration of this statute in action see Hudson v. 
Maryland State Housing Co., 207 Md. 320, 114 A. (2d) 421 (1955). 
65 Howe, "Forfeiture in Land Contracts," CURRENT TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION 417 at 
520 and 521 (1954); notes, 39 MINN L. REv. 93 (1954), 52 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1938). 
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of the government insurance programs, but for the purpose of this 
discussion it will be assumed that widespread home ownership is 
desirable as a matter of public policy, and that, in its accomplish-
ment, freedom of contract within reasonable limits should be per-
mitted to compete with federal paternalism. This suggests that a 
single statute on installment land contracts may not be desirable, 
but that, on the other hand, differing provisions should perhaps 
be made for the casual sales of homes by individuals, sales by pro-
fessional developers, sales of commercial property, and sales of 
agricultural property.66 As heretofore, the discussion which fol-
lows will be prilllarily concerned with the casual sale of a home by 
an individual with particular reference to the situation where 
that home is encumbered by a pre-existing mortgage. 
Any such legislation probably will, and no doubt should, pro-
vide some protection against unreasonably harsh forfeitures. But 
in this connection it is necessary to define .the term "forfeiture." 
A forfeiture occurs only when the seller is able to terminate the 
buyer's interest in the property by notice immediately after de-
fault or within an unreasonably short time thereafter. No forfei-
ture occurs if the buyer is given a reasonable time within which 
to reinstate his rights under the contract by making good his prior 
default. Strict foreclosure, therefore, involves no element of for-
feiture in this sense. 
Difficulty arises when a broader meaning is attached to the 
term, and attempts are then made to protect against this expanded 
concept of forfeiture by devising ways to make available to the 
defaulting buyer the value of his equity in cash. One way to 
accomplish this is to require the seller to make restitution of 
amounts previously paid by the buyer, less the damages occasioned 
to the seller by the buyer's breach, but this involves such large 
elements of hardship to the seller, as indicated above, that it does 
not merit serious consideration by any legislature. 67 The device 
66 Most of the discussions do not make this distinction. An exception is the note, 39 
MINN. L. R.Ev. 93 (1954), which is primarily concerned with the use of such contracts in 
financing the purchase of small farms. Legislation to take care of a particular situation 
of a different kind was once attempted in Kansas. This provided sellers with a remedy 
in forcible entry or detainer in the case of residential property located in cities of over 
100,000 population. The writer does not know the nature of the local situation which 
brought forth this legislation, but in any event the court struck it down as violating the 
uniformity requirement of the state constitution. Stevens v. McDowell, 151 Kan. 316, 98 
P. (2d) 410 (1940). 
67 The Ohio statute on conditional sales of chattels does contain such a provision. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Baldwin, 1953) §1319.14. A provision of this kind was once pro-
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most commonly resorted to for this purpose is foreclosure by sale, 
but from the limited evidence available to the writer it apparently 
has not been notably successful in this respect. Everyone is fa-
miliar with the mortgage foreclosure experiences during the de-
pression when deficiency judgments became sufficiently oppressive 
to call forth legislation.68 Even at present, with generally rising, 
or at least stable, real estate markets, deficiency judgments are 
apparently still the rule in foreclosure sales involving homes,69 
and sales which result in surplus proceeds for the mortgagor must 
certainly be rare exceptions. This is not hard to understand when 
it is remembered that foreclosure sales are always cs1sh sales whereas 
prospective buyers today generally require elaborate financing to 
make a purchase. 
None of this would seem to be of much concern to sellers, how-
ever serious such considerations may be from the buyer's view-
point. However, some danger to sellers would be involved in mak-
ing foreclosure by sale the prevailing remedy under installment 
land contracts, since in many states the legislatures might be in-
clined to extend the statutory provisions for redemption from sale 
to such foreclosures. This, of course, would destroy the principal 
advantage of the installment contract. In this connection it seems 
plausible to argue that the very existence of the government in-
surance programs tends to demonstrate that conventional mortgage 
law is inadequate to meet present needs in the business of buying 
and selling homes. Along the same line, and more directly perti-
nent to our main problem, it may be noted that it is presently 
almost hp.possible to obtain money from any financial institution 
on a second mortgage of a home. Both of these difficulties are 
posed for land contracts in New York, but was never adopted. See note, 52 HARV. L. REv. 
129 (1938). 
68 One example of such legislation is discussed in Gelfert v. Nat. City Bank, 313 U.S. 
221, 61 S.Ct. 898 -(1941). On foreclosure during the depression, see Carey, Brabner-Smith 
and Sullivan, "Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County: II," 27 !LI.. L. REv. 595 (1933). 
In footnote 52 at p. 612 the writers make the following observation: "If the mortgagor 
has in the course of time, by statute or otherwise, permitted the procedure of foreclosure 
by sale to replace strict foreclosure, in exchange for a redemption period, it has been an 
unwise bargain. Almost invariably today the sale is a mere formality since the mortgagee 
purchases the property, so the result is the same as in strict foreclosure except that now 
there is probably a deficiency judgment outstanding against the mortgagor. And the 
redemption is rarely exercised, to no small extent because of the heavy costs imposed by 
the present method of foreclosure." 
69 The Veterans Administration recently reported that a majority of recent foreclo-
sures involving mortgages insured by that agency have resulted in deficiency judgments. 
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probably due in large part to the time and expense involved in 
foreclosure sales and are especially acute in states having long 
statutory redemption periods. On the whole, then, it is submitted 
that the most realistic solution to the problem of forfeiture is to 
afford the buyer ample time within which to correct his default 
or, in the alternative, to negotiate a sale of the property and so 
realize the value of his equity in cash, if in fact. there is any 
realizable value. 
Even if it is agreed that reform legislation in this field should 
provide for strict foreclosure, further consideration must be given 
to the details of the procedure, for it is unlikely that the legisla-
tion will follow the classical equity pattern in all respects. For 
one thing, it has been the tendency in such statutes to spell out 
the length of the redemption period in terms of days or months.70 
The last sentence of the preceding paragraph indicates the factors 
which should be considered in setting this period. Having estab-
lished a period sufficient for the protection of the legitimate inter-
ests of the buyer, the legislature should then provide the seller 
with a remedy more expeditious and less costly than ejectment. 
The statutes in Michigan and other states which give the seller 
a summary remedy in the nature of forcible entry or detainer 
seem desirable in this respect. However, contrary to the Michigan 
statute and for reasons heretofore considered at length, it would 
also seem desirable to afford the seller the right to possession 
during the redemption period. Since this would not affect the 
buyer's ultimate right of redemption, it seems no more harsh than 
the summary eviction of a delinquent tenant. On the other hand, 
it would give the seller an opportunity to rent the property and 
so provide a source of funds from which to pay interest and prin-
cipal on any prior mortgage, and also taxes and insurance as well 
as the overdue installments on the contract itself. In many cases, 
sellers would probably not care to avail themselves of this oppor-
tunity because of the difficulties in making satisfactory arrange-
ments to rent the property for a relatively short period. This sug-
gests that the statute might very well spell out the extent of the 
seller's obligation in this respect in the event that he did take 
possession. 
What is suggested above bears a close resemblance to the 
original title theory of mortgages with strict foreclosure as the 
70 See statutes discussed in note 30 supra. 
952 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 54 
prevailing remedy,71 and there may be some incongruity in per-
mitting such a device to exist alongside the modem mortgage. 
On the whole, however, it seems like a reasonable compromise 
between freedom of contract-in a field where there is a demon-
strable need for such freedom-and the idealistic paternalism which 
has so long. prevailed in the thinking in this area. 
71 Except, of course, that under the original title theory the remedy of strict foreclo-
sure was not av:tjlable to a junior mortgagee because of the logical difficulty presented by 
the fact that he did not have title. 
